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There has been a considerable expansion of the volume of syndicated loans in emerging 
markets in the recent years. We provide the first analysis of the determinants of the 
decision of banks to syndicate a loan on a sample of loan facilities from 50 emerging 
countries. We show the significant role of loan characteristics and of financial 
development, banking regulation, and legal institutions, on the decision to syndicate a 
loan. We support the efforts of authorities to increase banking competition and efficiency, 
and to implement binding banking regulation on capital requirement to promote the 
expansion of syndicated loans. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In recent years the volume of syndicated loans in emerging markets has 
considerably grown from 9,343 billion dollars in 1992 to 251,019 billion USD in 2004.
1 
Today, syndicated loans represent an important source of external finance in emerging 
markets, corresponding in 2004, to more than 10% of the private credit of financial 
institutions in Malaysia, and more than 18% in Mexico.
2 
A syndicated loan is a loan for which at least two banks jointly grant funds to a 
borrower. In a nutshell, a lead bank establishes a relationship with the borrower and 
negotiates the terms of the loan agreement. This bank then finds participant banks which 
grant a share of the loan, receiving fees for this activity. There is consequently one single 
loan agreement in which each member bank of the syndicate owns a separate claim on 
the debtor. 
Banks can have several motivations to syndicate loans. First, syndication allows the 
diversification of loan portfolios. Second, it avoids excessive single-name exposure 
which can be prohibited by banking regulation, by still preserving the commercial 
relationship with the borrower. Third, it generates fee income for the lead bank, which 
can then diversify its income sources. Fourth, it allows banks suffering from a lack of 
origination capabilities in certain types of transactions to fund loans. 
These motivations should however be put into perspective with the potential agency 
problems generated by syndicated loans. Indeed there exists an adverse selection problem 
as the lead bank, owning information unavailable to the participants, may syndicate loans 
with the less favorable information. Furthermore a moral hazard problem arises from the 
fact that all participating banks have fewer incentives for monitoring than one bank 
granting the full loan (Pennacchi, 1988). 
Some potential benefits also exist for the borrowers. Indeed, according to Allen 
(1990) and Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004), syndicated loans are less costly than issued 
bonds in terms of origination fees, and than a series of bilateral loan agreements in terms 
                                                 
1 These figures are based on computations from the authors on the Dealscan database. They are presented in 
table 1. 
2 These figures are based on computations from the authors, with figures on syndicated loans from the 
Dealscan database and with figures for the private credit by financial institutions provided by Beck et al. 
(2000).   4
of spread. Furthermore, in comparison to bonds, syndicated loans can be arranged more 
quickly and more discreetly than bonds. 
The benefits of syndicated loans for banks and borrowers show that their expansion 
is important for economic development on emerging markets. On the one hand, this 
expansion contributes to enhance the sources of external finance and consequently favors 
investment in emerging countries. Because of the low development of financial markets 
in these countries, bonds are a limited alternative to bank loans for firms requesting large 
loans. Additionally, syndicated loans allow circumvention of bank’s lending limits. 
Moreover, if syndicated loans reduce the cost of borrowed funds, they also contribute to 
favor the financing of companies. On the other hand, the expansion of syndicated loans 
increases the diversification possibilities for banks in terms of risk and income, which 
decreases the likelihood of bank failures. As a consequence, the expansion of syndicated 
loans contributes to financial stability, which is a fundamental issue for emerging 
economies. 
Consequently, the expansion of syndicated loans contributes to the economic 
development of emerging countries, by encouraging financial development, which has 
been shown to favor growth (e.g. Levine, 2005 for a survey) and by reducing financial 
instability. 
It is therefore of utmost interest to identify the determinants of a bank’s decision to 
syndicate a loan. Indeed, these determinants provide policy-oriented advice for the 
authorities in favor of the expansion of syndicated loans, and therefore in favor of 
financial development and stability. These determinants also help explain the recent 
expansion of syndicated loans in emerging markets. 
Former empirical literature on syndicated loans is relatively scarce, in spite of their 
recent boom following the generalized use of databases on syndicated loans. Most studies 
however focus on another issue: identifying the size and composition determinants of 
loan syndicates, all on developed economies. Nonetheless, three studies can be partly 
related to ours. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) study the determinants of the decision to 
syndicate a loan with a sample of US loans. They support the positive role of several 
factors in this decision, with notably those related to the transparency of the borrower and 
the maturity of the loan. Furthermore two papers investigate syndicated loans issues for   5
emerging markets. While Nini (2004) examines the participation of local bank in loan 
syndicates, Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004) study the determinants of loan pricing for 
syndicated loans. 
Our paper is therefore the first research identifying the factors that comprise a 
bank’s decision to syndicate a loan in emerging markets. With this goal, we will test the 
role of several loan characteristics along the lines of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000). 
However, we will investigate the role of country-level variables for legal environment, 
financial development and banking regulation, thereby extending their analysis. Indeed, 
there is substantial evidence that institutional framework plays a role in bank behavior 
(e.g. Qian and Strahan, 2007), which suggests the potential role of these country-level 
variables. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some features for 
the loan syndication process and the syndicated market in emerging economies. Section 3 
discusses the tested determinants of the decision to syndicate the loan. Section 4 presents 
data and variables, and section 5 displays the results. Section 6 provides our conclusion. 
 
II. Loan syndication in emerging markets 
 
This section explains how the loan syndication process is implemented in the first 
subsection, and highlights features of syndicated loans in emerging markets in the second 
subsection. 
 
II.1 The loan syndication process 
Bank loan syndication can be considered as a sequential process, which in turn can 
be separated into three phases
3. During the pre-mandate phase, the borrower solicits 
competitive offers from banks to arrange and manage the syndication. It then chooses a 
lead bank, which is mandated to form a syndicate, and negotiates a preliminary loan 
agreement. The lead bank is responsible for the negotiation of key loan terms with the 
borrower. It acts as the syndicate’s agent, which involves such tasks as funds 
administration, interest calculation, and covenant enforcement. 
                                                 
3 See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of syndication.   6
During the post-mandate phase, the lead bank begins the syndication process by 
drafting a preliminary loan contract, preparing a documentation package for the potential 
syndicate members, and also inviting them to participate. The borrower and the lead bank 
jointly produce an information memorandum for the potential participants, i.e. the banks 
which might join the syndicate by funding a share of the loan. The memorandum usually 
contains information about borrower creditworthiness and the loan terms. A roadshow is 
then organized to present and discuss the content of the memorandum during which the 
participants can influence the loan characteristics. 
After the roadshow, the lead bank makes formal invitations to potential participants. 
The lead bank, trying to avoid over-subscription and under-subscription, tends to target 
participants with the “largest appetite” for the loan, making invitations to banks willing to 
supply the most funds, given the structure of the loan. Then the lead bank determines 
loan allocation for each participant bank. In the case of over-subscription, the borrower 
may choose a larger loan or the lead bank can scale back allocations. If the syndication is 
under-subscribed, the lead bank must either make up the difference or change loan terms 
and re-market the deal. 
The third and last phase takes place after completion. The loan becomes 
operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members by the debt contract. 
Lender compensation comes in several forms. When the loan agreement is signed, 
lenders receive closing fees to compensate them for the credit approval. While the lead 
bank earns an arrangement fee, participant banks may expect to receive a participation 
fee for joining the syndicate, the actual size of which may vary in accordance with the 
size of the commitment. Once credit is established and as long as it is not drawn, the 
syndicate members often receive a facility fee proportional to their commitment. As soon 
as the facility is drawn, the borrower may have to pay a per annum fee, usually to cover 
the costs of administering the loan. 
   7
II.2 Syndication in emerging markets 
Figures on the markets for syndicated loans in emerging markets from 1992 to 2004 
are displayed in table 1. We distinguish four geographical areas: Asia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, Middle East, Latin America. 
We observe an impressive increase of the volume of syndicated loans from 1992 to 
2004, even considering the reduction after 2000. Surprisingly, after 1996, the number of 
issues has been halved and since, remained stable. These both trends suggest that the 
mean amount of the syndicated loan should have considerably increased since 1996. 
Asia is by far the greatest market for syndicated loans in emerging markets, 
representing more than half of the volume and issues of syndicated loans for all dates. 
However the other emerging markets have increasing shares in syndicated loans, with a 
particularly fast increase for Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
III. Factors affecting the decision to syndicate a loan 
 
This paper investigates the factors that influence a bank’s decision to syndicate a 
loan.  We estimate a logit model in which the explained variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the loan is syndicated and zero else (Syndicated). We next discuss the 
explaining variables of the model. 
As mentioned in the introduction, syndicated loans present certain benefits and 
costs, which influence their use. Namely, banks may expect benefits from syndicated 
loans through the diversification of loan portfolios by reducing its implication in large 
loans and of sources of income with fee income obtained, the enforcement of the lending 
limits, the possibility for some banks suffering from a lack of origination capacities in 
certain types of transactions to participate to certain types of loans. 
Like all bank loans, syndicated loans involve potential agency problems between 
the borrower and the lenders. However they also allow for specific agency problems 
between the member banks of the syndicate resulting from the loan syndicate structure. 
The importance of these latter agency problems exerts consequently an impact on the 
decision to syndicate a loan. Syndicated loans generate two specific agency problems. 
First, the lead bank possesses more information about the borrower either because of the   8
private information collected through a previous lending relationship, involving screening 
and monitoring efforts, or through due diligence. This private information creates an 
adverse selection problem, as the lead bank may be inclined to syndicate loans from bad 
borrowers. However, such opportunistic behavior generates reputation risk for the lead 
bank and affects negatively the success of future syndications (Pichler and Wilhelm, 
2001). 
Second, the participant banks delegate some monitoring tasks to the lead bank in 
charge of the loan documentation and notably of the enforcement of covenants and 
collateral. Nonetheless, the lead bank has less incentive to monitor the borrower than if it 
were to lend the full amount of the loan (Pennacchi, 1988). As the efforts of the lead bank 
are unobservable for participant banks, this results in a moral hazard problem, which is 
exacerbated with the opacity of the borrower. 
Therefore, the factors that influence the syndicate decision are expected to be those 
which banks believe will modify the benefits and costs of syndicated loans. These factors 
are loan characteristics but they can also be country-level variables taking the 
institutional framework into account. 
 
III.1 Loan characteristics 
We first test the role of several loan characteristics which might impact the decision 
to syndicate a loan. Increased loan size (Loan Size) is expected to positively influence the 
decision to syndicate a loan. Indeed, the motives to diversify loan portfolios and to be in 
accordance with regulation are more likely to play a role for larger loans. 
Maturity of the loan (Maturity) is also considered, although whether it plays a 
positive or negative role is ambiguous. On one hand, greater maturity is associated with 
greater monitoring costs as long-term loans incur control of collateral and covenant costs. 
As a consequence, the moral hazard problem involved in syndicated loans is enhanced 
and therefore reduces the attractiveness of the deal for participant banks, resulting in an 
overall negative impact on the decision to syndicate a loan. On the other hand, greater 
maturity is generally associated with a greater risk of loan default, which incites the lead 
bank to syndicate the loan for the diversification motive.   9
We test several characteristics which provide lending banks with better protection 
in case of loan default and thus reduce loan loss. Such characteristics are expected to 
exert a role on the syndication decision mainly through their impact on potential agency 
problems. 
Our first idea was to consider the presence of collateral in the loan agreement 
through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured. However, since information 
on the presence of collateral is not available for one third of our observations, its 
inclusion in the estimations would have considerably reduced our sample.
4 
We instead include two other variables, which describe the increased protection of 
the lending banks in case of loan default. We take the presence of guarantors in the loan 
agreement into account, with a dummy variable equal to one if at least one guarantor 
exists (Guarantors). A guarantor gives additional protection for the lenders, as the 
guarantor will honor a part or the totality of the claim in case of loan default. Therefore 
the presence of a guarantor mitigates agency problems resulting from adverse selection, 
in line with the better information owned by the lead bank on the borrower. However 
empirical literature on the role of collateral in loan contracts provides evidence in favor 
of the “observed-risk hypothesis” according to which banks would be able to sort 
borrowers from information they have on their quality (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez 
and Saurina, 2004). As a consequence, banks would ask more protection schemes from 
riskier borrowers. Accordingly, the presence of a guarantor may signal a riskier loan and, 
consequently, a loan plagued by greater agency problems. Such loans might be more 
difficult to syndicate owing to the potential difficulty faced by the lead bank when 
finding participating banks. We therefore expect a negative coefficient for this variable. 
We also take debt seniority (Senior Debt) into account through a dummy variable 
equal to one if the debt is senior. Although debt seniority constitutes an additional 
protection for the lending banks in the case of loan default, its impact is ambiguous. If it 
works as an effective protection for the lenders, it should enhance the potential of 
syndication. But if the seniority does not apply equally to all syndicate members, its 
influence can be negative. Similarly, the “observed-risk hypothesis” also suggests a 
                                                 
4 We performed estimations with this variable with a reduced sample and found no significant coefficient 
for the presence of collateral. Lack of information for this variable, added to the non-significance of this 
coefficient, caused us drop this variable from our estimations.   10
negative impact on this variable, as the request for seniority may result from the 
perception of a higher risk of the borrower. 
The presence of covenants, which aim at restricting the discretionary power of the 
borrower, is taken into account with a dummy variable (Covenants) equal to one if the 
loan agreement includes covenants. Therefore, the presence of covenants in a loan 
agreement is expected to reduce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995), and 
enhance the ability to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs. It 
appears that covenants should favor the decision to syndicate the loan since they mitigate 
agency problems from moral hazard behavior of member banks during the monitoring 
process. However, empirical evidence tends to show the opposite: a positive link between 
the presence of covenants and the probability of default of the borrower (e.g. Foster et al., 
1998). This is in accordance with the “observed-risk hypothesis”, where riskier borrowers 
are offered more binding loan agreements. Therefore, arguments exist for both a positive 
and negative relationship. 
To account for the impact of publicly available information (S&P Rating) on a 
bank’s decision to syndicate a loan, we include in our regressions a dummy variable, 
equal to one if a Standard and Poor’s senior debt rating is available. We expect a positive 
coefficient since the existence of a rating mitigates the adverse selection problem. This 
problem results from information asymmetries between the lead bank and the participant 
banks regarding the borrower, and consequently favors the decision to syndicate a loan. 
We also consider the type and the purpose of the loan through the inclusion of 
dummy variables. Indeed, these characteristics might influence the decision to syndicate 
a loan. Therefore, we include two dummy variables for the loan type, which describe 
whether the loan is a term loan, or a revolving bank facility. Furthermore, we include four 
dummy variables to describe the purpose of the loan, including general corporate 
purposes, debt repayment, project finance, or working capital. We do not provide 
variables for other types and purposes in our regressions, since they represent less than 
5% of our sample. Finally, dummy variables taking year, geographical area and industry 
into account are included in the estimations. 
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III.2 Country-level variables 
We now turn to country-level variables which may be influential in the decision to 
syndicate a loan. Indeed, Esty and Megginson (2003) and Nini (2004) have pointed out 
that institutional factors might influence the syndication process in emerging markets. 
Therefore, we also test the role of the legal environment, financial development, and 
banking regulation. 
Our first category of country-level variables examines the role of financial 
development. Overheads, the ratio of banking overhead costs to total banking assets, 
measures cost inefficiency of a banking industry. Since syndicated loans imply the 
sharing of administration and origination costs, cost inefficiency is expected to encourage 
loan syndication. Consequently, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
Concentration, defined as the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all bank 
assets, proxies market structure of the banking industry. Several arguments imply a 
negative influence that this variable will have on the decision to syndicate a loan. First, a 
greater concentration means a lower number of potential participants to join and form a 
syndicate. Second, banks with greater market shares in a banking industry already benefit 
from diverse loan portfolios, and have little incentive to diversify further. Finally, the 
motivation provided by increased revenue from syndicated loans should exert a lower 
impact for banks with greater profitability, generally thanks to stronger market power. 
We also add two variables which take into account the development of financial 
markets.  Stock Markets, defined as the value of listed shares to GDP, measures the 
development of stock markets. The expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. Allen 
and Gottesman (2006) have shown that stock markets and syndicated loan markets are 
highly integrated enabling information flow among markets. The development of stock 
markets contributes to information disclosure, which mitigates the adverse selection 
problem resulting from the private information owned by the lead bank on the borrower. 
We should thus observe a positive coefficient for this variable. 
However one may also consider that stock markets are an alternative source of 
financing for large loans requested by companies. Therefore, one might consider that 
more developed stock markets reduce the potential for syndicated loans in a country, and 
consequently increase the share of bank loans which are not syndicated. Such influence   12
should be even more prominent for the development of bond markets, measured with the 
ratio of domestic debt securities to GDP (Bond Markets), as bonds directly compete 
syndicated loans for large financing needs of companies. But this negative influence may 
also be offset by the positive impact of the existence of bond markets, which contribute to 
increase information for participant banks in loan syndicates and therefore limits the 
adverse selection problem in syndicated loans. Consequently, the expected sign of the 
development of financial markets is ambiguous. 
Our second category of country-level variables is for banking regulation. We first 
construct the variable Mincar*CreditRisk, which is the product of the minimum capital 
requirement value and a dummy variable equal to one if the minimum regulatory capital 
ratio varies with bank credit risk. Indeed, what matters for minimum capital requirement 
is as much the existence of such requirements than its implementation. On the one hand, 
we expect a positive coefficient for this variable as the existence of capital requirement 
should contribute to favor the decision to syndicate a loan through the motivation of 
respecting the lending limits. This takes into consideration the fact that a stronger 
requirement increases the relevance of this motivation. On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient can also be observed as this capital requirement reduces the number of 
potential syndication participants, eligible in terms of adequate capitalization and thus in 
terms of funding advantages. 
Solvency is a dummy variable equal to one if the regulation establishes pre-
determined levels of solvency deterioration which forces automatic regulatory actions. 
Since syndicating the loan can help avoid the threat of regulatory intervention in the case 
of disregarded solvency levels (as long as the regulation is binding), we expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient. A similar supervisory feature is introduced through NPL 
Definition, a dummy variable equal to one if a formal definition of non performing loans 
exists. 
Asset diversification guidelines (Asset Diversification, a dummy equal to one if 
such guidelines exist) should positively influence the syndication process since they 
foster motivation for the diversification of loan portfolios. The regulations on lending 
abroad should also impact a bank’s decision to syndicate a loan, as such regulation 
reduces diversification opportunities for domestic banks. We therefore expect that the   13
coefficient of Abroad Loan Prohibited, a dummy variable equal to one if abroad loan 
making is prohibited, should be positive, as such prohibitions make syndication more 
attractive to gain more diversified loan portfolios. 
Our third and last category of country-level variables takes legal environment into 
account. Following a large body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta et 
al. (1997), legal institutions may exert a role on the decision to syndicate a loan. The 
most obvious channel of this impact should be through the agency problems that 
syndicated loans induce. 
Two indicators for legal institutions are included in our estimations. Protection of 
creditor rights is measured with the index provided by La Porta et al. (1998) (Creditor 
Rights). This index is scored on a scale from zero to four with a higher score indicating 
better protection. Law enforcement is measured with the ‘Rule of Law’ index also 
provided by La Porta et al. (1998) (Rule of Law). This indicator ranges from zero to ten 
with a higher score indicating a better enforcement of the law. 
The expected sign of the coefficient for these both variables is ambiguous. On one 
hand, we may expect a positive coefficient, as a better legal protection of banks mitigates 
the moral hazard problem induced by syndicated loans. Indeed, a better protection of 
creditors decreases the need to monitor the borrower, which reduces agency problems 
resulting from the monitoring efforts of banks involved in the syndicate. On the other 
hand, on a more global basis, the agency problems resulting from all lending decisions 
should also be mitigated which may favor the choice of a standard loan rather than a 
syndicated loan for the lead bank. Indeed, the motive of the risk-sharing should play a 
lesser role in well-protected legal environments. 
   14
IV. Data and variables 
 
The sample of syndicated loans comes from the Dealscan database, provided by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Data concerning financial structure and 
regulatory and supervisory characteristics come from the database “A New Database on 
Financial Development and Structure” provided by Beck et al. (2000), while data on 
banking regulation come from the database “Bank Regulation and Supervision” compiled 
by Barth et al. (2005). Indicators of legal environment come from La Porta et al. (1998). 
The sample size is determined by information availability on the variables used in 
the regressions. Following Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Lee and Mullineaux 
(2004), we use only completed and fully confirmed deals, excluding private placements. 
We therefore have a sample of 13,941 loan facilities from 50 emerging countries for the 
period between 1990 and 2006. The frequencies of loan facilities by country are 
displayed in table 2. Following our focus on emerging countries, syndicated loans come 
from 4 geographical areas, Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Middle 
East, which account respectively for 75.98%, 8.88%, 8.74%, 6.41% of the total number 
of loan facilities in our sample. Therefore, Asia represents almost three quarters of the 
loans in our sample. These shares are in accordance with the relative importance of each 
geographical area on the syndicated loans markets for emerging countries. 
Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for the variables. Appendix A.1 provides their 
definitions. We observe that 73.95% of loans are syndicated, which is in accordance with 
the coverage of the Dealscan database on large loans. The loan size confirms this fact 
with a mean of 200.96 million USD. We observe that syndicated loans are larger than 
non-syndicated loans, with respective means of 217,70 and 153,44 billion USD. Both 
facilities do not differ for maturity, as the mean maturity is almost the same (54 months). 
The covenants are only included in one quarter of loan contracts, with a far greater 
inclusion for syndicated loans (25.41% vs. 2.22%). The presence of guarantors is scarcer, 
being observed in only 8.67% of loan contracts with very similar means for both 
categories of loans. Furthermore, non-syndicated loans are more commonly senior debt 
for the lenders than syndicated loans (74.94% vs. 54.63%). These preliminary 
observations on these three latter variables are particularly interesting. Indeed, all three   15
were expected to have a similar positive influence on the decision to syndicate a loan by 





In this section, we will present our results. Our study explains the factors of the 
decision to syndicate a loan. We perform four logit regressions, with varying 
combinations of tested factors. 
All regressions include the loan characteristics. However, we test alternatively the 
role of the three categories of country-level variables. Namely, while the first regression 
does not include any country-level variable, the three following regressions alternatively 
add one category of country-level variables to explain the bank’s decision to syndicate a 
loan. Therefore, the second, third and fourth estimations respectively consider the role of 
financial development, banking regulation, and legal institutions, on the decision to 
syndicate a loan. All four regressions have satisfactory statistics in terms of likelihood 
ratio and Hosmer & Lemeshow statistic, as well as in terms of classification power, equal 
to 85% at least. 
Our two first major findings are the significant impact of most loan characteristics, 
and their robustness on any tested combination of determinants. Loan Size is positive and 
significant in all regressions, suggesting as expected that larger loans are more likely to 
be syndicated in accordance with the motives of the diversification of loan portfolios and 
of the regulatory-driven issues. The coefficient of Maturity is significantly negative in all 
estimations. This finding can be explained by the fact that greater maturity strengthens 
the moral hazard problem through higher monitoring costs of the loan. 
Among the three variables taking into account the reduction of the loan loss in case 
of default, we observe that only Guarantors is not significant in all estimations. We 
explain this finding by the compensation between two opposite influences: the reduction 
of the agency problems, and the association between this element and a greater risk of the 
borrower. Unlike the presence of a guarantor, the presence of covenants in the loan 
agreement matters as we observe a positive and significant sign for Covenants in all   16
estimations. This supports the view that Covenants contribute to mitigate the agency 
problems associated with syndicated loans. 
Oppositely, debt seniority plays a negative role in the decision to syndicate a loan. 
This finding may result from the fact that the rank of seniority does not apply 
homogenously for all member banks of the syndicate and might concern only the lead 
bank. This would result in making syndication less attractive for participant banks and 
thus limit the possibility to syndicate a loan. It is therefore of utmost interest to observe 
that, among the three variables reducing loan loss in the event of default, only the 
presence of covenants exerts a positive influence on the decision to syndicate the loan. 
Finally, the positive sign of S&P Rating, significant in three estimations, is in 
accordance with the fact that publicly available information favors the decision to 
syndicate a loan. Such information mitigates the adverse selection problem results from 
the better information possessed by the lead bank on the borrower. 
We can compare some of our findings with those from Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000). Both studies differ on the type of countries analyzed (these authors study the 
USA, while we investigate emerging countries), but also on the tested determinants. 
Nevertheless, three of our determinants were also tested in this study to explain the 
decision to syndicate a loan: the size of the loan, the maturity of the loan, and the 
availability of public information through the existence of bond ratings. 
Our results are similar to those of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) for the presence of 
a bond rating and for the size of the loan. They also find a positive impact of these 
determinants on the syndicate decision. However we disagree on the sign of the maturity. 
Indeed, they observe that the probability of loan syndication increases with maturity of 
the loan while we conclude the opposite. This difference in findings may be explained by 
the differences between the countries studied. 
We now turn to the analysis of the country-level variables. The main finding is the 
significance of most variables. In other words, institutions matter for the decision to 
syndicate a loan. All kinds of institutions matter in the sense that we observe significant 
variables for legal development, financial development, and banking regulation. 
Estimation (2) in table 3 presents findings for financial development variables. 
Financial development clearly matters for the decision to syndicate a loan, as all tested   17
variables are significant at the 1% level. The cost level of the banking industry exerts a 
negative impact on the syndicate decision, as the coefficient of Overheads is significantly 
negative. This finding was not expected since greater costs were supposed to increase a 
bank’s motivation to syndicate a loan. An interpretation of this finding may come from 
the fact that as cost inefficient banks have on average weaker managerial skills, their 
managers may be more reluctant to benefit from the opportunities allowed by syndicated 
loans. Concentration of the banking industry hampers as expected the probability for a 
loan to be syndicated. A concentrated industry means fewer potential participants at the 
local level to join a syndicate and also fewer incentives for banks to diversify their loan 
portfolios, since their larger market shares contribute to diversification. 
Furthermore, the development of stock and bond markets reduces the probability of 
syndicating a loan, as Stock Markets and Bond Markets have both a significantly negative 
coefficient. We explain this sign through the competing role of financial markets on 
syndicated loans. Indeed the potential market for syndicated loans is comprised of large 
financing needs which can generally be financed also by financial markets. Therefore, a 
greater degree of development of financial markets reduces the volume of loans which 
can potentially be syndicated by banks. As a consequence, it hampers the decision to 
syndicate a loan, as among the financing needs which are not financed by financial 
markets, there are fewer loans which could potentially be syndicated by banks. 
Regression (3) displays the findings for banking regulation variables in table 5. All 
have a significant influence on the decision to syndicate a loan. The three variables in 
connection with the lending limits have all the expected influence on this decision. 
Namely, the positive and significant coefficient of Mincar*CreditRisk is in accordance 
with the positive influence of a capital requirement on the syndicate decision in order to 
respect the lending limits, as a stronger requirement increases the impact of this 
motivation to syndicate loans. Similarly, following the positive and significant sign of 
Solvency and NPL Definition, the presence of a regulation establishing predetermined 
levels of solvency deterioration or a formal definition of non-performing loans favors the 
decision to syndicate a loan. 
Although both variables were expected to exert an impact through the 
diversification motive, their influence is inconsistent with our predictions. Indeed we   18
observe that the presence of asset diversification guidelines which were supposed to 
foster the motive of diversification for banks has a negative influence on the decision to 
syndicate a loan. Finally, the existence of regulations reducing the diversification 
opportunities for domestic banks does not exert a significant impact on the decision to 
syndicate a loan, in accordance with the lack of significance of Abroad Loans Prohibited. 
From these results on the five variables for banking regulation emerge interesting 
conclusions for syndicated loans in emerging markets. Indeed, the lending limits motive 
seems to matter more than the diversification motive. 
Lastly, the results with the legal environment variables are presented with the 
regression (4) in table 5. We observe that both variables are significantly negative, 
meaning that greater protection of creditor rights and stronger law enforcement hamper 
the decision to syndicate a loan. This may seem surprising at first glance. We might 
indeed have expected that better-protected creditors would participate more willingly in a 
loan syndicate. However we must remember that we are not explaining the volume of 
syndicated loans but rather the decision to syndicate a loan. The alternative to syndicate a 
loan is to grant a non-syndicated loan. Therefore, as all types of loans are favored by 
better protection of creditors, there is no straightforward reason why this latter element 
should foster loan syndication. 
Greater creditor protection weakens the diversification argument for use of a 
syndicated – rather than normal – loan and therefore provides a negative influence. This 
is the obvious motivation behind risk-sharing. This enhanced protection allows banks to 
increase risk exposure while protecting against excessive loan loss. 
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we have provided evidence 
to explain the role of several loan characteristics in the decision to syndicate a loan, 
helping illuminate the decision to syndicate a loan at the bank level. 
Second, we have shown that institutions influence the decision to syndicate a loan. 
Indeed we undoubtedly found that financial development, banking regulation, and legal 
environment exert an impact on this decision. Therefore, the cross-country differences in 
the expansion of syndicated loans may be explained by cross-country differences in 
institutional framework.   19
Third, the observed impact of tested variables suggests the prominence of certain 
motives for the use of syndicated loans. Namely, all variables associated with the motive 
of respecting lending limits have expected signs in accordance with this motive. The 
motive of diversification appears to play a smaller role for the syndicate decision, as the 
impact of country-level variables with connections to this motive is not consistent in sign. 
The agency problems implied by syndicated loans seem to matter in the decision to 
syndicate a loan, but not as much as expected. This remark is based on the fact that only 
one among the three tested variables contributing to increase lender protection in case of 
loan default exerts a positive influence on the loan syndication. A more thorough analysis 
would be needed to conclude the hierarchy of the motives of the syndicated loans. 
Fourth, our findings on the role of the institutional factors provide useful insights 
for authorities wishing to favor syndicated loans, owing to the associated benefits in 
terms of diversification of loan portfolios of banks and reduction of the cost of borrowed 
funds. Authorities should implement more binding banking regulation on capital 
requirements, solvency levels and non-performing loans, and favor banking competition 
and cost efficiency. However, efforts to enhance the development of financial markets 
and the improvement of the legal institutions should not favor the expansion of 
syndicated loans. We do not mean that such efforts are useless for economic 
development, but we argue that they do not enhance financial development through a 




Syndicated loans have undergone a major expansion in emerging markets in the last 
decade, representing now an important source of external finance. Syndicated loans offer 
several benefits in comparison to other types of loans, which make them of utmost 
importance for the economic development of the emerging countries. Namely, they favor 
the diversification of bank’s loan portfolios and help reduce the cost of borrowed funds, 
thereby improving financial stability and investment. To better understand the recent 
expansion of these loans and, more specifically, to provide policy-oriented advice for the   20
authorities to favor syndicated loans, it is of utmost interest to know which determinants 
favor loan syndication. 
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of the decision to syndicate a 
loan by analyzing the role of loan characteristics following the study design of Dennis 
and Mullineaux (2000) on US syndicated loans. Additionally, we examined institutional 
factors inspired by recent literature on the role of institutions on a bank’s loan behavior 
(e.g. Qian and Strahan, 2007). Our findings show that several loan characteristics are 
influential in the decision to syndicate a loan. We also observe the impact of institutional 
factors taking into account financial development, banking regulation, and the legal 
environment. This finding suggests that cross-country differences in the expansion of 
syndicated loans may be explained by cross-country differences in institutions. 
The normative implications of our findings are the support of the efforts to increase 
banking competition and efficiency, and to implement binding banking regulation on 
capital requirements. Conversely, a striking result is the negative impact of the 
development of the financial markets and the strengthening of the legal institutions on the 
syndicate decision. 
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways. It would be of interest to know 
the determinants of the composition of the syndicate (i.e. the number of lenders 
involved), as well as the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold by the lead bank. 
Such investigations will contribute to a better understanding of the syndicated loans 
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Table 1 
Figures on syndicated loans 
 
 
The table below provides the volume in billion USD and the number of issues for syndicated loans. Source: 
own computations from the authors on the Dealscan database. 
 
 






Volume      
1992  6,208  3,135 -  - 9,343 
1996 121,726  10,656  10,514  15,230  158,126 
2000  183,800  25,721 8,936 44,597  263,055 
2004 149,209  21,230  42,890  37,689  251,019 
Number of issues      
1992  78  12 -  - 90 
1996 1306  54  78  108  1546 
2000 647  93  74  226  1040 
2004 662  76  156  148  1042 
 
   23
Table 2 
Frequencies of loan facilities by country 
 
 
The table below provides frequencies of loan facilities by country, with the breakdown between syndicated 
and non-syndicated loans, for the sample. 
 










Argentina 214  208  6  Mexico  388  375  13 
Azerbaijan 14 14  0  Oman  45  39  6 
Bahrain 63  63  0  Pakistan 46  41  5 
Brazil 210  205  5  Panama  34  30 4 
Bulgaria 27  26  1  Peru  35  34  1 
Chile 194  179  15  Philippines  299  216  83 
China 647  570  77  Poland  146  128  18 
Colombia 80  78  2  Qatar  46 39  7 
Croatia 67  62 5  Romania  51  45 6 
Czech Rep.  80  74  6  Russia  362  336  26 
Egypt 71  67  4  Saudi  Arabia  77  64  13 
El Salvador  8  8  0  Singapore  580  385  195 
Estonia 24  21  3  Slovak  Rep.  47  42  5 
Guatemala 12 12  0  Slovenia  72  65  7 
Hong-Kong 3010 1222  1788 Sri  Lanka  17  9  8 
Hungary 150  144  6  Taiwan  1684  1467 217 
India 473  403  70  Thailand  588  482  106 
Indonesia 793  729  64  Trin.  Tobago  11 11  0 
Iran 28  26  2  Turkey  386  348  38 
Israel 34  31  3  Ukraine  36  35  1 
Kazakhstan 92  86  6 UAE  95  64  31 
Korea 1873  1373  500  Uruguay  6  3  3 
Koweit 48  42 6  Venezuela  46  45 1 
Latvia 25  24  1  Viet-Nam  30  18  12 
Lithuania 25  20  5  Total  13941  10310  3631 
Malaysia 552  302  250        
   24
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the sample 
 
 
The table below provides means and frequencies computed on our dataset of loan facilities. Definition of 
variables appears in the Appendix A.1. 
 
Variable  Sample size  Full sample  Syndicated loans  Non-syndicated 
loans 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for dummy / discrete variables 
        
Syndication 13  941  0.7395  1  0 
S&P Rating  13 941  0.0626  0.0679  0.0476 
Covenants 13  941  0.2457  0.2541  0.0222 
Senior Debt  13 941  0.5992  0.5463  0.7494 
Guarantors 13  941  0.0867  0.0875  0.0843 
Term Loan  13 941  0.5051  0.629  0.1534 
Revolving 13  941  0.1085  0.1375  0.0262 
Corporate Purposes  13 941  0.2891  0.2088  0.5169 
Debt Repayment  13 941  0.1723  0.2001  0.0934 
Project Finance  13 941  0.0838  0.1034  0.0281 
Working Capital  13 941  0.0745  0.0834  0.0493 
Credit Risk  10 442  0.1615  0.1731  0.1053 
Solvency 9  805  0.7185  0.7077  0.7750 
Asset Diversification  10 467  0.1706  0.1598  0.2233 
NPL Definition  10 443  0.6606  0.6699  0.6155 
Abroad Loan Prohibited  10 467  0.4185  0.4132  0.4438 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
        
Loan Size  13 941  200.96  217.70  153,44 
Maturity 13  941  54.00  53.99  54.00 
Overheads 12  931  0.0321  0.0327  0.0304 
Concentration 12  945  0.5725  0.5594  0.6105 
Stock Market  12 771  1.2591  0.8889  2.3364 
Bond Market  10 882  0.3556  0.3352  0.407 
Creditor Rights  11 533  3.0030  2.7852  3.5293 
Rule of Law  11 533  6.6130  6.3414  7.2694 
Min CAR  10 467  8.7108  8.7146  8.6922 
 





Logit regression. The dependent variable is Syndicated, a dummy variable equals to one whether the loan is 
syndicated and zero else. Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. Dummy variables for loan type, 
loan purpose, year, geographic area, industry sector are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  (1)  (2)  
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std  error Coefficient Std  error 
Intercept -5.4388***  0.67  11.5871  299.00 
Loan  Size  0.4078*** 0.03 0.4190*** 0.03 
Maturity  -0.0074*** 0.01 -0.0083*** 0.01 
Covenants  1.0247*** 0.08 1.0240*** 0.09 
Senior  Debt  -0.5167*** 0.13 -0.8249*** 0.16 
Guarantors  0.0289 0.10 0.1080 0.12 
S&P  Rating  0.3402***  0.12 0.3263** 0.15 
Overheads -  -  -15.2575***  2.75 
Concentration -  -  -1.9785***  0.22 
Stock Markets  -  -  -0.2567**  0.03 
Bond Markets  -  -  -1.7729***  0.22 
N  13 941    10 749   
Log-likelihood  -4 230.93    -3 008.46   
Likelihood ratio  7 529.37***    6 893.57***   
Hosmer & Lemeshow st.  299.98***    188.62***   
% concordant  90.6    92.7   
 





Logit regression. The dependent variable is Syndicated, a dummy variable equals to one whether the loan is 
syndicated and zero else. Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. Dummy variables for loan type, 
loan purpose, year, geographic area, industry sector are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  (3)  (4)  
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std  error Coefficient Std  error 
Intercept -0.1678  0.82  -3.7367***  0.77 
Loan  Size  0.1355*** 0.03 0.4178*** 0.03 
Maturity  -0.0080*** 0.01 -0.0075*** 0.01 
Covenants  0.8469*** 0.09 1.0016*** 0.09 
Senior  Debt  -0.5847*** 0.16 -0.5238*** 0.15 
Guarantors 0.1337  0.13  -0.0824  0.11 
S&P  Rating  0.0898  0.14 0.2791** 0.14 
Mincar*Credit Risk  0.0483***  0.02  -  - 
Solvency 0.3001**  0.15  -  - 
Asset Diversification  -1.0598***  0.16  -  - 
NPL Definition  0.6755***  0.08  -  - 
Abroad Loan Prohibited  -0.0070  0.16  -  - 
Creditor Rights  -  -  -0.4419***  0.04 
Rule of Law  -  -  -0.0700***  0.02 
N 9  773    11  533   
Log-likelihood  -2 819.37    -3 350.85   
Likelihood ratio  2992.50***    7 243.41***   
Hosmer & Lemeshow st.  182.71***    197.10***   
% concordant  85.6    92.3   
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Appendix A.1: Brief description of all variables and their sources 
 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Loan contract characteristics   
Syndicated  =1 if the loan is syndicated  Dealscan 
Loan  Size  Logarithm of the size of the loan in thousand 
dollars 
Dealscan 
Maturity  Maturity of the loan in months  Dealscan 
Loan Type  =1 if the loan is a term loan  Dealscan 
S&P  Rating  =1 if a Standard & Poor’s senior debt rating 
exists 
Dealscan 
Guarantors  =1 if there is at least one guarantor  Dealscan 
Covenants  =1 if the loan agreement includes covenants  Dealscan 
SeniorDebt  =1 if debt is senior  Dealscan 
   
Country characteristics   
Overheads  Ratio of banking overhead costs to total banking 
assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Concentration  Assets of the three largest banks as a share of 
total banking assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Stock Markets  Value of listed shares to GDP  Beck et al. (2000) 
Bond Markets  Domestic debt securities to GDP  Beck et al. (2000) 
Mincar  Minimum capital requirement value  Barth et al. (2005) 
CreditRisk  =1 if the minimum regulatory capital ratio varies 
with bank credit risk 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Solvency  =1 if the law establishes pre-determined levels of 
solvency deterioration which forces automatic 
actions such as intervention 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Asset Diversification  =1 if asset diversification guidelines exist  Barth et al. (2005) 
NPL Definition  =1 if a formal definition of non-performing loans 
exists 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Abroad  Loan  Prohibited  =1 if banks are prohibited from granting loans 
abroad 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Creditor  rights  An index aggregating four aspects of creditor 
rights. The index ranges from zero (weak creditor 
rights) to four (strong creditor rights) 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Rule  of  Law  An index indicating the law enforcement. The 
index ranges from zero (weak enforcement) to ten 
(strong enforcement) 
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